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Key Points
Mining operators need to make

1	
   sure that the energy demand of
mining operations is met,
especially in remote areas,
where there is little or no
connectivity to national grids.
To address electricity deficit, the

2	
   mining industry has adopted

different solutions depending on
the power situation of the
country, the projects’ energy
demand, and the projects’
distance from the grid. For a
mining company, the goal is to
maximize cost-savings.
For a host country, the challenge

3	
   is to maximize welfare gains to

ensure that this mining demand
for power, which often translates
into investment in power
infrastructure, is leveraged to
build a more robust power
generation and electric
transmission system as well as
accelerate rural electrification.
Both, cost savings and welfare

4	
   gains can be met simultaneously if
sound regulations and efficient
coordination mechanisms are in
place.
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Introduction
Problem Statement
The World Bank estimates that African investment needs in infrastructure would cost
US$93 billion per year, only half of which is for the power sector.1 As shown by the
following table, some countries will need to more than double their existing generation,
simply to meet the demand from mining customers, not to mention increased demand
from local under-served populations.
Estimate of additional electricity consumption from mineral projects in selected
sub-Saharan African countries likely to come into production by 2019.

Angola
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
CAR
Congo-Brazzaville
DRC
Côte d'Ivoire
Eritrea
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
TOTAL
Source: USGS report

Estimated annual
consumption ( GWh)
24
260
550
560
190
250
5600
320
280
480
720
1500
100
210
500
670
80
360
530
160
780
290
790
870
6900
440
2400
260
26074

% of 2008 generation
capacity
1%
44%
93%
10%
119%
56%
75%
6%
104%
24%
9%
163%
1%
105%
147%
60%
5%
73%
96%
1%
35%
145%
35%
1450%
3%
10%
25%
3%
8%

2

1

C. Briceño-Garmendia, K. Smits, V. Foster, “Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns, Issues,
and Options,” Africa Infrastructure Sector Diagnostic Background Paper No. 15 (Washington D.C.: The World Bank,
2008).
2
D. I. Bleiwas, "Estimates of Electricity requirements for the recovery of mineral commodities, with examples applied
to Sub-Saharan Africa", USGS (2011), available at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/1253/report/OF11-1253.pdf
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According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic conducted by the World Bank,
Africa faces an annual infrastructure funding gap of US$31 billion.
At the same time, mining companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly
concerned about the limits or absence of electricity, increasing power costs, and more
stringent power regulations. In South Africa, the lack of power has already heavily
impacted the mining industry. In 2008, because of the power crisis, AngloGold Ashanti,
for example, lost 270,000 ounces of gold production. After a five day shutdown, the
authorities ordered the country's largest mineral producers to restart operations using
no more than 90% of the previous power supply, in order to avoid new blackouts. 3
Indeed, in South Africa, the energy intensive mining sector accounts for approximately
17% of the national electricity consumption.4
The availability of power lies at the core of a mine’s development strategy; mining
operators need to make sure that the energy demand of mining operations is met. This
is especially the case in remote areas, where mining companies are developing large
projects with little or no connectivity to national grids and very limited options for
electricity supply.
To address these energy problems, the mining industry has adopted different solutions
depending on the power situation of the country, the projects’ energy demand, and the
projects’ distance from the grid:
-‐
When sourcing from the grid is too expensive5 or when there is no grid, industry
finances and builds its own power generation facilities or sources from a third-party that
is a private power generator (Situations 1 and 2)
-‐
When sourcing from the grid is less expensive than own generation, industry
either sources from the grid or finances/co-finances the upgrade of the power assets
under various arrangements with the public utility (Situation 3).
For a mining company, the goal is to maximize cost-savings. For a host country, the
challenge is to maximize welfare gains by leveraging any investment in power
infrastructure development for the electrification needs of the country. This could be
through connecting the mine to the grid and incentivizing the company to produce extra
capacity to sell to the public utility in order to increase supply and reduce the electricity
cost, or by requiring that the privately- financed network is open to third-party access, so
that towns and populations between the mine and the grid benefit from the privately
financed distribution lines as well.
Both, cost savings and welfare gains can be met simultaneously if sound regulations
and efficient coordination mechanisms are in place.
3

AngloGold Ashanti, “AngloGold Ashanti’s response to the power crisis,” available at:
http://www.anglogold.com/subwebs/informationforinvestors/reports08/power-crisis.htm
4

Republic of South Africa, Energy Efficiency Strategy for South Africa (Pretoria: Department of Minerals and Energy,
April 2004).
5
On average in Africa, the cost is 18 cts/kWh average for grid-supplied power and 40 cts/kWh when firms pay for
backup generators to avoid blackouts, Source: P. Fairley, "Power Potential and Pitfalls on the Congo: Developing
Africa’s Cleanest and Largest Hydropower Opportunity," Earthzine (March 8 2010)
http://www.earthzine.org/2010/03/08/power-potential-and-pitfalls-on-the-congo-developing-africa%E2%80%99scleanest-and-largest-hydropower-opportunity/
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Without appropriate regulation, the opportunity for the country will be missed. In DRC,
for instance, after the development of the mining project of Tenke Fungurume, the
surrounding communities suffered from increased power supply shortages.6 The mining
company refused to share its power generation infrastructure with the city, despite
repeated requests from the local population. For a variety of reasons, the project has
now become so controversial that the government threatens to expropriate the
company.7
Without appropriate coordination mechanisms within the mining industry or between the
industry and the government, scale economies will be lost. In Liberia, a World Bank
study suggests that a single cost-effective large-scale power plant supplying all the
mining sites, with a built in surplus to be sold to the state-owned utility, instead of many
smaller decentralized thermal power plants, could result in “aggregate savings of US$
1.6 billion in lifecycle energy costs over the next 20 years”. 8
Therefore to take advantage of the opportunity of the investments of the mining industry
in power infrastructure, and make sure that the country benefits from those investments,
an appropriate planning, regulatory and commercial framework is needed. If power
assets are leveraged and designed to contribute to the development of public
infrastructure at the national, regional or community levels, the incremental capital cost
of building additional capacity could be reduced and the economic and social spillover
effects can extend far beyond the mining sector.
The purpose of this Policy Paper is to distil good practice principles observed in power
infrastructure development leveraging the mining industry’s energy demand around the
world, informed by expert opinion.
Context and Research Questions
The case for public private coordination for investment in power assets
Coordination within the mining industry and between mining companies and the
government can result in significant economic gains. Indeed the underlying fact is that
the marginal capital cost of additional generation capacity is generally lower than the
cost of building a whole new power plant.
According to calculations based on U.S. Energy Information Administration data,9 for
example, the overnight capital costs per kilowatt installed for a coal power plant of
1,300MW are roughly 10% lower than a plant which has half the same size (650 MW).

6

P. Kumwamba and A-S Simpere, “Soul mining: the EIB’s role in the Tenke-Fungurume Mine, DRC” (Kinshasa and
Paris: Action Against Impunity For Human Rights – Friends of the Earth France, August 2008), available
at: www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/Soul_Mining.pdf
7
“Partners give ground to agree Tenke Fungurume terms,” Mining Journal, October 22, 2010, available at:
http://www.mining-journal.com/finance/partners-give-ground-to-agree-tenke-fungurume-terms.
8
World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” Infrastructure Policy Notes, World Bank
for the Republic of Liberia (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2011)
9
BCS, “Mining Industry Energy Bandwidth Study,” Report to U.S. Department of Energy (June 2007), available at:
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/industries_technologies/mining/pdfs/mining_bandwidth.pdf
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This, in part, reflects the fixed costs in constructing a power plant (obtaining land,
permits, design etc.) As a result, if we consider the capital cost of the incremental
650MW (in the big power plant of 1300MW) and we compare this capital cost with the
capital cost of the first 650MW, we obtain a 20% reduction to the ultimate consumer in
the capital cost of the additional 650MW generated from that plant.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), hydro power plants could also
provide significant economies of scale. In terms of run-of-rivers plants10, investments
costs decrease from US$ 2- US$ 4 million/MW to US$ 2 - US$ 3 million/MW as power
plant capacity increases from less than 10MW to 10-100MW. In terms of dams and
reservoirs11, which tend to have more capacity, investments costs decrease from US$
2-US$3 million/MW to less than US$ 2 million/MW as power plant capacity increases
from 100-300MW to more than 300 MW.12
Moreover, for hydro-plants, as most of the generation cost is associated with the
depreciation of fixed assets, the generation cost decreases if the projected plant lifetime
is extended or capacity is expanded. According to the International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA), average installed costs for adding extra capacity or renovating the
hydroelectric power plants range from US$ 500/kW to US$ 1,000/kW, a smaller
investment per kilowatt than for building a new power plant. This suggests that there
could be additional economies of scale if a plant was refurbished or upgraded.13
Therefore this is often more economically rational to coordinate investments in power
generation operating in a country in order not to miss scale economies: one bigger
power plant serving a mining area is often less expensive to all users than many
individual power plants set up at each mine site.
Avenues to leverage the mining industry’s energy demand will depend on the
commodity and mine type
Energy requirements vary considerably for each commodity. According to a US
Department of Energy study14, coal mining and metals mining (iron, lead, gold, zinc, and
copper) have roughly equivalent energy needs, requiring around 160,000 Btu/ton
(0.05MWh/ton) of material handled. However, when recovery ratios (percentage of
valuable ore within the total mined material) are taken into account, metals mining is
generally much more energy intensive than coal mining, as coal mining has a recovery
ratio of 82% on average, while for metals, the average ratio is approximately 4.5%.
10

Run-of-river: this type of project normally has no or very little storage capacity. Generally, small plants are more
likely to be run-of-river facilities.
11
Dams and reservoirs are of two types – 1) reservoir: this type of power plant has the ability to store water in a
reservoir in order to de-couple generation from hydro inflows. Reservoir capacities can be small or very large ; 2)
pumped storage: this type of scheme uses off-peak electricity to pump water from a lower elevation reservoir to a
higher elevation so that the pumped storage plant can generate power at peak times and enhance grid stability.
“Renewable energy technologies: cost analysis series,” Volume 1: Power sector, International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA), Working Paper (2012), available at:
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_Analysis-HYDROPOWER.pdf
12
“Renewable Energy Essentials: Hydropower,” International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010), available at:
http://www.iea.org/papers/2010/Hydropower_Essentials.pdf
13
IRENA, “Renewable energy technologies: cost analysis series,” 2012, op. cit.
14
BCS, “Mining Industry Energy Bandwidth Study,” 2007, op. cit.
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Among metals, gold and silver have the lowest recovery ratio of 0.005%. Further
technological improvements are in great demand in the mining industry, as they reduce
the quantity of waste material handled and improve energy efficiency in the industry.
Energy use in mining also depends on the extent to which the commodity must be
beneficiated or processed, and also on whether it is underground or surface. Due to a
significant increase in hauling requirements, ventilation, water pumping, and other
operations, underground mining operations require significantly greater amounts of
energy than surface mining operations. According to the same U.S. Department of
Energy study mentioned above, underground coal mining in the United States, for
example, requires 325,000 Btu/ton of coal recovered, compared to 55,000-77,000
Btu/ton for surface operations. The US Geological Survey’s estimates for coal energy
needs in sub-Saharan Africa are between 185,000 Btu/ ton for underground and 61,000
Btu/ton for surface mining.15
According to the same U.S. Department of Energy study, the major energy sources
used in the U.S. mining industry include diesel fuel accounting for 34%, followed by
onsite electricity at 32%, and natural gas at 22%. Coal and gasoline supply the rest of
the energy.16 Electricity is generally used for ventilation systems, water pumping, and
crushing and grinding operations, while diesel fuel is used for hauling and other
transportation processes.17 This breakdown of energy sources can of course differ in
other areas such as in Africa but the idea remains that electricity is one of the energy
sources used by the mine. Its portion in the energy needs of the mining industry is
however significant enough to be an opportunity for the host country to leverage in order
to improve its power infrastructure.
Avenues to leverage the mining industry’s energy demand will depend on the energy
sources of the country
Sourcing electricity from the grid in a country rich in hydropower sources is cheaper
than in a country relying on thermal sources.
According to EIA estimates18, U.S. average Levelized Maintenance & Operation Costs
for hydro power plants are US$10/MWh, less than the US$32.6/MWh for conventional
coal plants. Those numbers contribute to a smaller total system levelized cost of
hydropower than thermal power (US$ 89.9/Mwh and US$ 99.6/Mwh respectively).19.
Hydropower, when associated with storage in reservoirs, can store energy sometimes
over years and can supply big quantities of energy at cheaper costs than any other
energy source. Hence, sourcing electricity from a hydro-grid is cheaper than sourcing
15

Bleiwas, "Estimates of Electricity requirements for the recovery of mineral commodities, with examples applied to
Sub-Saharan Africa," 2011, op. cit.
16
BCS, “Mining Industry Energy Bandwidth Study,” Report to U.S. Department of Energy," 2007, op.cit.
17
U.S. Department of Energy, “Energy and Environmental Profile of the U.S. Mining Industry,” (2002), available at:
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/industries_technologies/mining/pdfs/overview.pdf
18
“Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2012”, U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) (January 23, 2012), available at: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm
19
A. Sharma, “Hydro Power Vs Thermal Power: A Comparative Cost-Benefit Analysis”, International Journal of Arts
and Sciences 3(9): 125 - 143 (2010); See also Wood Mackenzie, “Clarifying specific concession models that are
competitive,” Report to Greenland Development Inc. (GDI, 2009); See also IRENA “Renewable energy technologies:
cost analysis series,’ Volume 1: Power sector” (2012), op. cit.
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from a thermal grid or thermal power sources (such as diesel generators or coal-fired
power plant) even in countries where the grid is not functional and the non-industrial
demand is low such as in DRC (see box 23). Of course many countries will rely on a
grid based on a mix of hydro and thermal energy sources especially given that hydro
facilities require massive amounts of water and can be rain-dependent.
In addition to the regulatory framework, the type of available energy source as well as
the type of mine will determine the power sourcing options for the mine and the potential
for leveraging those options for the benefit of the host country.
Research questions and summary of issues
A worldwide survey of existing institutional arrangements of power sourcing options for
mining companies shows the existence of several common barriers that hinder the
incidence of mutually beneficial coordination either between mining companies and the
government or within the mining industry itself:
1. Planning in the mining industry utilizes a different time-span from that of
government agencies, making coordination of investments difficult.
2. Mining companies may perceive reliable power supply and earlier access to
power as a competitive advantage, which makes resource pooling and joint
strategy formulation within the mining industry rare.
3. Mine investors generally have little incentive to construct power plants with
greater capacity than their mine’s demand if no incentivizing regulatory and
commercial framework is in place. For instance, appropriate legislation for mining
companies’ power generation does not always exist or does not properly address
the possibility of selling electricity to the grid.
4. Mining often takes place in remote areas and building the distribution grid up to
the mine concession results in an expensive undertaking that the government
cannot always afford and that the mine is not always interested in financing. In
this situation, the only way for the country to benefit is for the mine site
community to be supplied in electricity by the mine. When this is not required by
the contract and not part of an integrated local plan, this is often not a
sustainable solution.
The rest of the Policy Paper will highlight situations where those barriers have been
lifted, differentiating between the following cases:
-‐
-‐
-‐

there is no grid or the grid is too remote from the mining area (Situation 1),
sourcing power from the grid is more expensive than own-generation (Situation 2),
and
sourcing power from the grid is less expensive than own-generation (Situation 3).

Leveraging the mining industry’s energy demand to improve host countries’ power infrastructure
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The table below summarizes the different issues presented in this Policy Paper.
Situation

Mining
reaction
Builds and
owns own
generation

What can the
country do?
Encouraging the
mine to provide the
mine-site community
with access to
electricity

Possible institutional
arrangements
-The mine helps the community
with off-grid solutions as part of
CSR
-The mine helps the community
upon contract requirements
- The mine and the local
government share responsibility to
give the mine-site community
access to electricity
- The mining energy demand is
leveraged to expand the grid up to
remote areas

Sourcing power
from the grid is
more expensive
than owngeneration

Builds and
owns owngeneration or
buys from a
third-party

Encouraging
production of excess
capacity and sale to
the grid

-The mine doesn’t produce extracapacity and only meets its own
needs
- The mine sells excess power to
the utility
- The mine sells excess power to
end-users
- The mine serves as an anchor
customer for third-party investment
in power generation

Sourcing power
from the grid is
less expensive
than owngeneration

Sources from
the grid and
relies on backup generators
for security

Encouraging more
consumption of the
mine’s own
generation or
encouraging the
mine to invest in
expanding and
upgrading power
assets to avoid a
grid reaching
capacity

-The mine buys all power from the
grid
-The mine is encouraged to
consume more of its generators to
alleviate the grid
-The mine upgrades or expands
the grid network and gets
refunded or gets bills credits
-If allowed, the mine builds and
operates the additional network
capacity
-The mine resorts to smart
technology to be producer and
consumer

Cross-Cutting
Issue

Coordination:
-‐
What are the benefits of more coordination?
-‐
What kinds of coordination mechanisms exist between the company and the country?
-‐
How can countries align the power generation investments of individual mining projects with the
national plan when mining plans are time-sensitive and public-private coordination takes time?
-‐
What are the consequences of the lack of coordination?

There is no grid
or the grid is too
remote from the
mining area

Issues tackled in the
paper
-How to encourage mining
companies’ contribution to
the electrification of the
community?
-What should laws and
contracts require?
-What is the breakdown of
responsibilities between the
government, the company
and the community?
- If the grid is expanded,
who
is
financing
the
expansion?
- What are the different
elements of an appropriate
regulatory framework to
encourage the production of
surplus to be sold to the
grid: power sector reform,
IPP,
PPA,
independent
regulator?
-What are the advantages of
connecting the mines to the
grid for the mines and for
the grid?
-How can governments
encourage group power
plants?
-What are the existing
commercial arrangements
with the public utility to
encourage more
consumption of the idle
capacity of own-site
generators?
-What are the existing
commercial arrangements
with the public utility to
encourage the mining
investment in the creation or
upgrading of power assets?
-What types of technological
models are available to
boost mining companies’
participation in the electricity
market either as a producer,
consumer or both?

1. Situation One: There is no grid or the grid is too remote from the mining area
In the situation where there is no grid, mining companies are forced to construct their
own generation facilities. Without an established distribution/transmission system, the
only way for host governments to benefit from mining investments is to encourage or
require mining companies to supply electricity to local communities, either by building a
micro-grid around the mine site, or through the provision of off-grid distributed power
Leveraging the mining industry’s energy demand to improve host countries’ power infrastructure
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systems. In this situation, the challenge for the government is to articulate a plan stating
when mining companies’ contribution to development stops and when government’s
prerogatives start.
Relying on off-grid supply to local communities
Some mining companies insist on the provision of local electricity as part of their
corporate social responsibility. In Papua New Guinea, for example, some neighboring
villages have been supplied with a few solar panels, but such endeavors are not part of
any mandatory or systematic program. As a matter of fact, the government of Papua
New Guinea has even tried to make the local provision of electricity a contractual
requirement but the loose language leaves the requirement to company’s judgment call
(see box 1).
Box 1: Papua New Guinea – Loose legal language and companies’ corporate
social responsibility programs
In Papua New Guinea, a standard mining development contract drafted in 201020
introduces the possibility for the mining company to generate electric power in excess of
the project’s needs in order to meet local rural requirements but also stipulates that
“[t]he Company (Joint Venturers) shall under no circumstances be required to increase
the capacity of its electric power supply facilities or transmission facilities beyond that
required by the Approved Proposals for Development to meet the needs of any other
users or to construct or maintain any off-site grid or distribution system.”
Given this loose requirement, companies either invest in electricity generation
exclusively for their own needs, or in some isolated cases, supply electricity to local
communities as part of their corporate social responsibility program. As an incentive, the
government also grants tax credits (Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme (ITCS)) in
exchange of spending up to 0.75% of the value of the project’s gross sales on approved
infrastructure projects. 21
The owners of Lihir Gold Limited, for example, contracted with the Australian company
Rainbow Power Company to install a US $164,000 project, including 8 solar panels, 12
batteries, and 6 fluorescent lights on some villagers’ homes on Lihir Island.22 The
operation was advertised as part of the corporate social responsibility initiatives of the
company.
Even if some of those projects have significantly contributed to the economic
development of local communities, such projects are few and far between. Rarely do
they fit into a systematic approach or into any regulatory framework. For instance in
Guinea in the Siguiri mine, the company coordinated a plan with the local government to
equip the community with electricity, but only after protests (see box 2).
20

Standard Mining Development Contract Draft between the Independent State for Papua New Guinea and (name of
the company) (2010), Article 5.7, available at:
http://www.mmdaproject.org/presentations/PNG%20Full%20Revised%20Standard%20MDC.pdf.
21
G. Hancock, “Sustainability of mining impacted communities in Papua New Guinea. Fiscal revenue sharing
mechanisms: Status and Practice,” Workshop on sustainability and the governance of mining revenue sharing on
April 4-5, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/miningtaxationghancock.pdf.
22
Rainbow Power Company, “Solar power for village homes,” available at:
http://www.rpc.com.au/products/services/faq-info/lihirarticle23oct.html.
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Box 2: Guinea – AngloGold Ashanti forced to procure the community with
electricity to save its social license to operate
In Guinea, “AngloGold Ashanti commissioned a new electric power line from Siguiri
mine to the nearby town, and provided two Caterpillar generator sets to give the
community 1.2MW of power”,23 explains the World Gold Council on its website, but this
initiative came as a result of villagers’ protests against AngloGold Ashanti for failing to
provide services to the local community. With the electricity provision to the community,
the company and the local government came up with a plan featuring the following
breakdown of tasks between the parties:24
- The government is responsible 1) for the design of the power transmission line and
circuitry (the approval of the mine’s Engineering Department is needed to ensure
compatibility and define boundaries); 2) for the maintenance of transformers, the
overhead line and line switches for transmission reticulation; 3) for fuel supply to the
generator sets.
-The company is responsible for providing the generators to the town, maintaining the
generator sets and the switchgear, shut the plant down once every week for three hours
to conduct maintenance on the sets. The mine is entitled to disconnect power
generation to Siguiri town in emergencies to ensure that there is no disruption in
production at its operations.
Although this plan comes after protests, the merit of this plan between AngloAshanti
and the local government is to articulate the responsibilities of both the company and
the government, notably in terms of responsibility for operations and maintenance.
This latter responsibility is often not borne by the company, not planned for by the
government and consequently the investment of the mine in the community is often not
sustainable.
Requiring the provision of local electricity supply under the concession agreement
Another solution used by host countries to make sure that mining investments in
electricity generation would benefit local communities has been to require mining
companies to supply local electricity as a condition to the granting of the mining
concession. In Liberia, for example, the government requires the mining company
building a power plant to design excess capacity for neighboring communities (see box
3).
Box 3: Liberia – Contractual Requirement to designing excess capacity for the
community
In Liberia, the government negotiated with the Putu project’s mining operator the
following clause: “the Power Plant shall be designed to generate a quantity of electric
energy in excess of the electric energy required by the Company for Operations to
supply third party users located within a 10 km radius thereof on a 7 days per week, 24
hours per days basis in accordance with third party user demand from time to time. The
Company may charge residential users reasonable rates for their power usage based
23

World Gold Council, “Sharing utilities: mines extend water and power to communities,” (2012), available at:
http://www.goldfacts.org/en/society/utilities/
24
AngloGold Ashanti, “Guinea Report 2008”, p/ 28-29. , available at :
http://www.anglogold.co.za/NR/rdonlyres/4A3DD0C1-6C99-46D8-B6E8-1E105D53B1BA/0/guinea_report_2008.pdf
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upon their ability to pay. The Company may charge businesses commercially
reasonable rates for their power usage. The Company shall provide electric power free
of charge to non-profit organizations and Government agencies.”25
Moreover, section 19.3(d) requires the Power Plant to be designed and constructed in a
way that allows expansion “on a commercially feasible basis to have twice the electricity
generating capacity required to service Operations.”
Developing model concession agreements mandating the provision of electricity within a
certain radius would increase certainty for investors, as well as put all mining companies
on an equal footing with regards to their corporate social responsibility programs.
Those mandatory requirements should stem from a policy framework encouraging,
targeting and planning around the decentralized energy generation of the mines. Indeed
this decentralized energy can be an essential opportunity for the remote communities
from the grid given its advantages: efficiency is improved at the facility level (capacity is
tailored to the demand), losses on the transmission lines are reduced (given that higher
voltages are hard to carry over long distances, a reduction in the haulage distance
increases efficiency), smaller technologies such as renewable energies are easier to
develop for logistic reasons.26 However without a policy framework, decentralized
energy will not benefit the communities.
In Papua New Guinea, mining companies call on the state to create a framework that
would give an incentive to wider private participation. In particular, their criticism focuses
on the lack of operating and maintenance budgets from the local governments,
insufficient subsidies to end-users hampering the development of viable commercial
markets, and the lack of “Community Service Obligation” (CSO) financing.27
In addition, this policy framework should consider the question of sustainability of the
investment beyond the closure of the mine: who is ensuring the maintenance of the
system? What is the succession plan for the power infrastructure after the mine closes?
Should the community pay for the electricity? and if so, at which reasonable charges?
As part of the answers to those questions, the framework should consider whether the
energy demand coming from the mine cannot and should not be leveraged to expand
the grid to these remote areas to connect those islands of mine-based decentralized
energy.
Leveraging the mining’s energy demand to assess the expansion of the grid to remote
areas
•

Feasibility

25

Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and Putu Iron Ore Mining,
Inc., dated as of September 2, 2010.
26
A. B. Lovins and H. L. Lovins, Brittle Power: Energy Security for National Security (Andover, Massachusetts: Brick
House Publishing Company, 1982) pp. 223, 231, 232.
27
Asian Development Bank, "Town Electrification Investment Program, Sector Assessment (Summary): Energy,"
available at: http://www2.adb.org/Documents/RRPs/PNG/41504/41504-01-png-ssa.pdf.
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Expanding the grid to connect the different mines raises a series of financial and
technical challenges that are specific to each country and case. The overall costs
depend both on the load of power that each connected mine needs and the distance:
the greater the power needs of the mine and the shorter the distance, the lower the
levelized unit cost of power transmission.
In Liberia, for example, connecting concessions and their power generation assets to
the grid would be economically effective for only some of them (see box 4).
Box 4: Liberia – Expanding the grid is not economically rational for all
concessions
In Liberia, for example, a World Bank report estimates that annual iron ore production
requires 10 to 20 MW/million tons. As for gold, a small to -medium sized mine
consumes 30 to 50 MW/million tons annually. Under this scenario, the levelized unit
cost (LCOE)28 of power transmission according to the report, is less than half a dollar
cent per kilowatt-hour for an iron ore mine and less than one dollar cent per kilowatthour for a gold mine.29
Because of the small differentials in power generation costs between grid power and
power produced at mines, it would be cost-effective to expand the national grid and
incorporate mining projects. The grid expansion would allow the mines to either buy
from the grid or sell to the grid.
On the other hand, because agriculture and forestry concessions demand much less
electricity (1 MW per concession maximum), connecting those operations to the grid
would be uneconomical in most cases and powering them through their own-power
based on biomass residuals would be a more cost-effective solution. 30
• Financing the grid expansion
Connecting mines’ own-site generation to the grid is also beneficial for the mine. The
advantage lies in the increase in reliability and elimination of the need to buy energy
storage, since the excess electricity can be sold back to the grid. Therefore the question
is who is financing the grid expansion? It will depend on the arrangements with the
public utility but as a general rule, financing the grid expansion often relies on state
participation, especially when it comes to connecting remote areas. Public participation
is particularly justified in a context where the infrastructure is used by the public. In
Quebec, where the strategy is to leverage mining companies’ presence to expand the
grid to remote Nunavik, the participation of the provincial government depends on the
“value of the benefit granted and the level of risk involved” (see box 5).
Box 5: Quebec – Equity interest in exchange of infrastructure
Quebec government hopes to extend the transmission grid to Nunavik to supply mining
operations in the territory. The extension of the electrical grid toward Nunavik will seek
to fulfill a number of objectives: the provision of power to mining operations across the
28

Levelized costs represent the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over its
financial life, converted to equal annual payments and amortized over expected annual generation from an assumed
duty cycle
29
Those assumptions, however, are very case sensitive and the study assumptions were that for an iron ore mine,
power demand would be 100 MW and for a gold mine, it would be 30 MW.
30
World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” 2011, op.cit
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territory; the connection of various Nunavik communities to Hydro-Québec’s main
electrical grid, which will replace current electrical production generated by local thermal
power facilities with clean, renewable hydropower; and the integration of future
hydroelectric installations in Nunavik. 31
In Quebec province, mining companies are responsible for the provision of their own
infrastructure where access to existing networks or grids is limited. However, while
public infrastructure projects may help lure mining investments in northern Quebec, the
provincial government will determine the government’s participation in infrastructure
development along common good and shared use criteria.32 The size of the
government interest “will depend on the value of the benefit granted and the level of risk
involved.”33 Quebec has already notified thirteen developers of its government’s interest
in taking a stake in their projects.34
Financing the grid expansion is a very expensive undertaking for a country and the
challenge is often to earmark enough revenues for it. In Brazil, wire charges(i.e. fees
paid to access transmission lines, levied on generators) feed public benefits funds,
which then invest in energy efficiency, renewable energy, energy-related research and
development, as well as assistance to low-income customers in electricity provision.35
The example of Brazil provides an additional way to leverage the mining generation:
wire charges could be collected from the mines when they connect to the grid. As will be
seen further in Situation 2, those charges should be reasonable enough to work as an
incentive for the mine to connect to the grid.
2. Situation Two: There is a grid and sourcing from the grid is more expensive
than own-generation
In the situation where the electricity provided by the grid is more expensive than own
generation, mining companies have a clear incentive to invest in their own power
generation. Therefore, the challenge for host countries is to develop incentives for the
mining industry to build additional generation capacity and increase domestic supply to
the grid, which would help reduce the cost of the grid electricity in return.
In the context of difficult geopolitics, increasing domestic supply is particularly
encouraged. In the case of Mongolia, for example, mining companies invest in own-built
generation because the government is searching to gain independence from the
neighbors (see box 6).
31

F. Tomesco, “Quebec Aims to Boost Mining With Infrastructure in Budget,” Bloomberg News (March 21, 2012),
available at: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-20/quebec-aims-to-boost-mining-with-infrastructure-inbudget
32
"Les infrastructures reliées aux projets, c’est l’affaire des minières,” Les Affaires (February 18, 2012), available at:
http://www.lesaffaires.com/archives/generale/les-infrastructures-reliees-aux-projets-c-est-l-affaire-des-minieres--jean-charest-premier-ministre-du-quebec/541038
33
Tomerco, “Quebec aims to boost mining with infrastructure in budget,” 2012, op. cit.
34
Québec and Its Natural Resources, Finances Québec, Budget 2012-2013, available at:
http://www.budget.finances.gouv.qc.ca/Budget/2012-2013/en/documents/resources.pdf
35
See Brazil Law No. 10848 of 2004. See also G/ de Martino Jannuzi and A. Poole, “Public benefit funds are not
enough to secure energy efficiency and energy R&D activities: Lessons from Brazil,” (2006), available at:
http://www.fem.unicamp.br/~jannuzzi/documents/1692006ACEEE.pdf
Leveraging the mining industry’s energy demand to improve host countries’ power infrastructure

13

Box 6: Mongolia – Avoiding foreign dependence
The Oyu Tolgoi mining project, a joint venture between the Government of Mongolia,
Ivanhoe Mines, and Rio Tinto, will start commercial operations in 2013. It will produce
450,000 tons of copper and 330,000 ounces of gold per year. It needs 600 MW for its
operations at peak production.36 For now, diesel generators provide the necessary
energy, but Oyu Tolgoi LLC has been allowed by the government of Mongolia to build a
600 MW dedicated coal-fired power plant. 37
The project developers had also planned to build a 220 kV 170km transmission line
through the desert to connect the project to the Chinese grid and sign an additional
power purchase agreement with the governments of China and Mongolia to allow
Chinese electrical power to be imported into Mongolia.38 But this project has raised
concerns from the government of Mongolia for two reasons. First, the government does
not want to rely solely on one source of power, and wants to develop and control its own
generation capacity. Second, receiving electricity from China would mean higher costs
of electricity supply than local power plants.39As a result, it has been agreed that the
transmission line to China will be considered as a “stop-gap measure.” In addition, the
government of Mongolia foresees that any private line which connects to the Central
Electric System and which is of or above 220 kV must be state-owned. 40 Moreover,
Oyu Tolgoi mining contract even foresees that all the electric power must be sourced
from within Mongolia after four years of mine life.41
Those private initiatives occur in a context where the government is focused on the
development of a Programme for an Integrated Power Energy System. Its goal is to
extend the power supply to all the country’s areas, build additional power projects under
PPP/BOT agreements, reduces exports and increases its power independency from its
neighbors China and Russia.42
In Chile, similarly, the government seeks independence from its neighbors after
Argentina started, in 2004, to substantively reduce natural gas exports to energy – poor
Chile. But interestingly as opposed to Mongolia, instead of requiring investment in owngeneration, the government asked the mining industry to invest in energy efficiency (see
box 24).
As we saw in Introduction, mining companies can benefit from a gain in marginal cost if
extra capacity is built. Yet even if the marginal capital costs are lower, an appropriate

36

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Southern Mongolia Infrastructure
Strategy (Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009),
available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMONGOLIA/Resources/SMIS_July.pdf
37
A. MacDonald, “Ivanhoe to build Oyu Tolgoi power plant by 2017,” Market Watch (December 9, 2011), available at:
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ivanhoe-to-build-oyu-tolgoi-power-plant-by-2017-2011-12-09
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Ivanhoe Mines, “Ivanhoe Mines announces 2011 financial results and review of operations – Oyu Tolgoi coppergold-silver project on track to start initial production in third quarter of 2012,” 2012, op. cit
39
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P. Ker, “Rio Tinto in Mongolian power struggle,” Brisbane Times (March 21, 2012), available at:
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legal and regulatory regime is needed to encourage the mining investment in power
generation beyond their own needs.
Developing the appropriate regulatory framework
• Need for a power sector reform?
To induce more investment in additional generation, most emerging and developed
countries have gone through a power sector reform since the 1980’s (starting with
Chile) to unbundle the natural monopoly activities (transmission, distribution) from the
competitive ones (generation, trading, supply) as well create a competitive wholesale
and/ or retail market43. The principal features of this standard model of reform are “1)
stand-alone transmission company, 2) privately-owned, competing generation
companies that bid into a bulk/wholesale power pool, 3) supply competition for all or
part of the retail market, 4) third-party access to transmission and distribution on nondiscriminatory, transparent terms, 5) independent and transparent regulator”.44
Realizing the insufficiency of public funds for new generation as well as the poor
performance of the state-owned utilities, Sub-Saharan Africa has also gradually
followed the trend of power sector reform and according to the World Bank Africa
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) covering 24 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
all those countries besides a few exceptions enacted a power sector reform law: “ threequarters introduced some form of private participation in power; two-thirds corporatized
their state-owned power utilities; a similar number established some kind of regulatory
oversight body; and more than a third have independent power producers in
operation.”45 However the impact of the reform has remained limited and the general
model is a hybrid model whereby the national state-owned utility, still vertically
integrated, holds a dominant market position, by imposing a single buyer requirement
and keeping its own generation plants (this situation is now contested by mining
companies in South Africa – (see box 13 )). The private participation though limited
however exists, notably in the form of Independent Power Producers (IPPs). While
waiting for the power sector reform to be furthered beyond the hybrid model46, countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa can still create regulatory incentives to leverage the electricity
demand of the mines and encourage companies to generate extra capacity to be sold
back to the grid: those incentives include strong IPP and PPA legislations as well as an
independent regulator mechanism regulating tariffs and access charges to ensure IPPs’
power sales happen on equal terms with existing generators.
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A wholesale market is a market where a generator does not sell directly to the end-users, but to public and/or
private retailers, including, for example, transmission and distribution companies.
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• Developing IPP legislation licensing generators to sell to the grid
An IPP is an entity, which is not a public utility, but which owns facilities to generate
electricity for sale to utilities and sometimes end users. Developing an IPP legislation is
therefore necessary when the public utility cannot afford investments in additional power
generation and transmission, and when the mining investments in power generation can
supplement the public utility’s investments. South Africa and its public utility Eskom are
in the throes of this reform (see box 7).
Box 7: South Africa – Endeavors to increase private participation in the power
sector Although Eskom, the State-owned power utility, does not have exclusive
generation rights in South Africa, it generates approximately 95% of the electricity
used47 and maintains the national grid. In 2009, IPPs generated less than 2% of the
electricity produced in South Africa.48 Prior to the 2008 electricity crisis, self-provision
was seen to be prohibitively expensive and risky, but that is changing because of a
better local understanding of the available technologies, a substantive increase in
Eskom tariffs and a deterioration of electricity supply by Eskom. The government has
implemented reforms to facilitate investments by IPPs. Eskom has been suffering from
severe financial losses and can’t afford generation investments any longer. A law has
been passed in Electricity Regulation Act No. 4 of 2006 (the Act)49 and under the
pressure of the mining sector and of the energy industry more generally, a new law is
being discussed to improve market conditions for private participants (see box 13).
Before developing IPP legislations, some countries such as India have developed the
Captive Power Plant (CPP) status for those entities willing to generate power for their
own needs, but with no intention to sell to the grid. India provides for an interesting
illustration (see boxes 8, 9 and 17) of a country that faced with systematic power
shortages, under-capacity of the national power network and limited impact of the
reform of the power sector50 decided to leverage companies’ own generation. For this
reason the Indian government has progressively changed the CPP legislation to allow
CPPs to sell to the grid and operate as IPPs (see box 8).
Box 8: India – The regulatory framework and economics of CPPs
The Central Government has supported the development of an independent power
generation industry under its National Electricity Policy of 200351 and has subsequently
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Reegle, “Energy profile: South Africa,” available at: http://www.reegle.info/countries/south-africa-energy-profile/ZA
49
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progressively lifted the licensing requirement for electricity generation.52 In addition in
2008, the National Electricity Act of 2003 was altered to authorize the sale of electricity
at the Indian Energy Exchange (IEX), through which CPPs can sell to both companies
and State Electricity Boards. The idea was to create a platform for the quick sale of
electricity to users that would be faced with shortages of power.53
In this regulatory context, the economics of CPP happens to be more favorable
compared to that of traditional grid generators for three reasons. First, CPPs may be
able to pass on increased feedstock costs to consumers via the end product being
manufactured by the parent plant,54 whereas traditional generators generally have to
absorb any increase in feedstock costs. Second, Indian CPPs have been able to sell on
a spot basis, taking advantage of power shortages. Third, Indian CPPs generally
employ cogeneration (using the waste heat from industrial processes such as cement
manufacturing), which increases the efficiency and lowers the marginal cost of power
production. Since CPP power costs can be half that of grid generators, many
companies prefer buying electricity from CPPs rather than electricity from the public
grid, which is more expensive.55 In addition the 2010 Indian regulation56 allows a
renewable energy supplier to sell to a distribution licensee at a price to be fixed at the
“pooled cost of power purchase”, meaning the weighted average price of electricity
generation (including cost of self-generation) that the distributor has purchased from all
energy sources to the exclusion of renewable energy sources (which includes cogeneration): the generator can therefore keep the profit margin if renewable energy is
cheaper to produce than the average.
For these reasons, some Indian CPP operators have reported large profits. For
example, Jindal Power (a subsidiary of Jindal Power and Steel) almost sells half of the
electricity produced in its CPPs.57 Jindal Power plans to add another 2,400MW of
generating capacity to its existing plant. Essar Group, currently uses 85% of its
1,600MW power for captive purposes (steelworks and refining operations), and sells
300MW to the state electricity authority pursuant to a 20 year power purchase
agreement, based on a 13% return on equity. Any increase in fuel or other costs is
passed on to the customer. Essar Group has announced plans for a 10,000MW
expansion plan mainly focused on non-captive off-take that would reduce captive use to
just 20%.58
Regardless of the distinction between IPP and CPP, one of the key elements lies is in
the regulation of licensing, be it for the development of the generation facility or for
electricity trade. The regulations applicable to licensing, the nature of the licensing
52
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administration and the speed of its process will more or less create market incentives
for the firms to invest in additional generation. The process can also be simplified by
forgoing the licensing requirement for the generation stage, as it is the case in India,
although Indian authorities still require a license for interstate electricity trading59 and
the CPP operator still needs to comply with a series of technical requirements to ensure
the quality of the electricity supplied.
• Developing Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) legislation
Where capacity expansion is required, the investment costs must be recoverable and
revenue streams sufficiently definite into the future to enable the owner to obtain
financing on reasonable terms. Therefore, regulations may allow providers and
customers to enter into long-term contracts whereby the customers (the utility or other
users) commit to buying a minimum amount of capacity from the owner over a longer
period. This is generally preferred by infrastructure service providers as it provides more
certainty and is usually necessary to obtain financing for the investment required.
Therefore developing the appropriate framework for such contracts that are called
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) in the power sector is a key factor to ensure the
participation of mining companies in electricity generation. In addition to indicating who
would buy the power, “a strong PPA details quantity and cost of power bought,
dispatching of plants, fuel metering, interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer,
termination, change of legal provisions, refinancing arrangements and dispute
resolution mechanisms”.60
A first type of PPA arrangement is signed between the mining company, as
electricity generator and seller, and its purchaser. As an increasing number of
mining companies decide to vertically integrate with power operations, this arrangement
is more and more common in the mining industry. Firstly, the purchaser under the PPA
can be the public entity as a single buyer, this is the case in most of the countries in
Africa. Secondly, if the system is structured as a wholesale market, the PPA can be
signed with the entities owning the distribution lines.
In markets that went through further reforms and that are qualified as being retailed
markets, the PPA can also be signed directly between the mining company and a largescale user, either another large-scale industrial entity or a group of customers that offers
guarantees of sufficient financial capacity as well as demand stability to constitute a
profitable client under the PPA. When the utility’s financial capacity is limited or not
creditworthy and the generator can count on the presence of large customers, the
absence of single-buyer requirement is usually an incentive for mining companies to
invest in extra-capacity. The challenge of this arrangement is that generators would
“capture” large-scale end-users, thus leaving the public utility with low-income
customers, and therefore lower revenues as in the case in India (see box 9).
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Box 9: India – Discrimination against CPPs to save the business model of the
utilities
India’s CPPs are facing problems. Firstly, local governments are quite resistant, as
there have strong vested interests in their state-owned generating and distribution
companies; some state policies even discriminate against captive power plants by
levying various charges (such as charges for grid support, high sales tax, etc.) that
discourage market entry and distort the market in favour of the incumbent. Secondly,
regulators in certain states are beginning to clamp down on CPPs, fearing that too great
of a migration of industrial customers away from grid generators toward CPPs will
damage the Indian cross-subsidization model, whereby industrial customers pay a
higher tariff to subsidize residential and agricultural customers. For example, in the
Maharashtra state, the government plans to raise the maximum electricity duty charged
on CPP owners (including alternative energy producers) by four times, as well as the
duty charged on electricity produced by CPPs to third-parties.61 The idea is to hamper
the development of CPPs, because if industrial users all use power generated by CPPs,
the public electricity provider will not have any customers but below-poverty line endusers and farmers. Finally, the Indian state of Gujarat elected to charge CPPs a fee for
using the distribution network, and made them provide in-kind compensation for
transmission losses; for example, to sell 1MWh to a customer, the CPPs had to provide
1.11MWh into the grid.62 This has made CPP economics difficult and given no incentive
to the distribution company to reduce losses.
A second type of PPA arrangement is signed between the mining company, as a
purchaser and a seller, a third-party electricity generator that can provide both power
and ancillary services (e.g. transmission system monitoring, voltage control, scheduling
and dispatch, metering and billing, etc.). In jurisdictions where this status exists, this
third party generator will be an IPP. Three reasons explain why a mining company
would contract with a third party:
- the third party provides cheaper electricity than the public provider,
- the public provider does not provide sufficient electricity,
- the mining company decides that electric generation is not part of its business model.
Under this model, the IPP bears the risks and obligations associated with ownership,
including commercial risks and maintenance obligations (see box 10). The mining
company can have an equity stake in this IPP to keep some control over the
development and management of the generation facilities.
Under this model, the mining industry serves as anchor customers for third-party
investments in power generation. (See also the example of Zambia in box 18.)
Box 10: South Africa – Anglo American and its IPP
To power its platinum mine that requires a secure power supply for continuing
operations as well as future expansion, Anglo American is seeking to sign for a 450 MW
coal-fired power project with an IPP in Emalahleni municipality, South Africa. It is a
build-operate-and-own project planned to start commercial operations in 2015. This
61
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project “navigate[s] the relatively uncharted territory related to third-party use of the
transmission and distribution system”.63
Tasks among the different parties are allocated as follows:
(1) Role of Anglo American. Anglo American provides the land, the coal (the
developer will have access to the discard dumps of Anglo American Thermal Coal),64
and the water (coming from Anglo American’s Emalahleni Water Reclamation Plant
from BHP Billiton’s closed South Witbank mine). Anglo American is also the loan
facilitator, in charge of securing financing through international loans (Capex US$ 1
billion).65
(2) Role of IPP. Anglo American plans to sign a Coal Supply Agreement and a 25-year
Power Purchase Agreement with the IPP to buy its entire capacity. In addition, Anglo
American will sign Supplementary Supply Agreements with Eskom to use the electricity
produced at the IPP plant for the mining operations.66 In parallel, the IPP signed
Connection, Transmission, Use of System and Operating Agreements with Eskom to
allow the IPP to sell its electricity to Eskom, and an agreement was also signed
between Anglo American and Eskom in order for Anglo American to off-take power from
a substation to be built by Eskom.67
(3) Role of the public electricity provider. Under the government’s electricity strategy
laid out in its Integrated Resource Plan,68 Eskom is in charge of determining the terms
of the connection agreements, the timing of the infrastructure, the use of System costs
(Anglo American criticizes this legal framework and judges that the costs are too high by
international standards, and that there is insufficient support to guarantee a fair
allocation of costs.)
(4) Role of other public agencies. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa
(Nersa) and the Department of Energy provide support to facilitate the contractual
arrangements for third-party use (regulatory framework, appropriate pricing, timing of
connection), and they must approve them.
Interestingly, Anglo American states that some of the project’s goals, in addition to
serving for self-generation, include the need to contribute to local development, i.e.
community needs, skills transfer, the development of secondary industries, as well as
the provision of affordable electricity services “at no additional cost” to Eskom, the
National Treasury or the consumers of South Africa, and to regional development.69
In the case of Exxaro, this is the mining company itself that engages in the business of
either third party generator or facilitator given the high expected proceeds and the
opening of the power market in South Africa. For this purpose Exxaro created the
subsidiary Exxaro Energy (see box 11).
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Box 11: Exxaro – The development of an energy business for third-parties
Exxaro Energy owns and operates the power generation on behalf of hosts, which then
buy Exxaro’s electricity under a PPA.
Two of the strategic branches of Exxaro Energy are Exxaro Onsite and Exxaro IPPs.
-‐ Exxaro On Site is a joint venture between Exxaro (51%) and Prana Energy (49%), a
developer of clean power-generation facilities. 9 projects are forecast from 1012 to
2018 for total capacity of 400 to 600 MW. Exxaro On Site does project management,
feasibility, securing of funding and construction, and then sell the power back to the
host companies.70
-‐ Exxaro IPPs does not hold equity in the IPPs and does not finance them, but
facilitates their creation so that Exxaro can sell coal to them and then secure for
them the offtake agreements as well as obtain access to the grid on the basis of
Eskom's generation being unbundled from the transmission entities as is envisaged
by the reform (see box 13).71

• Setting up an independent regulator
Given that the public utility is a state-owned entity engaged in commercial activity, it is
uniformly recognized that private participation in the power sector necessitates an
independent regulator. In order to encourage the mining industry participation in the
power market, this independent regulator will have the following mandates:
Mitigating risk: Where the seller under the PPA is an IPP that must invest in sufficient
generation capacity, the regulator must be capable of assessing risks. Risks, for
example, include delays in payment, which will increase capital costs and therefore
electricity prices. Risk mitigation is particularly necessary in the situation where there is
a non-viable state-owned single buyer with whom, in Africa, the PPA is typically signed.
As a result, most IPPs accept PPAs only with utilities with sovereign guarantees, such
as escrow accounts, currency conversion, repatriation of profits, guarantees against
nationalization and expropriation, and political risk insurance offered by multilateral
organizations such as the World Bank.
Regulating the tariff charged by the PPAs: The regulation of tariffs charged by the
mining company selling under the PPA is necessary whatever the structure of the power
market (vertically integrated with private participation, wholesale market or retail
markets).
This might be considered as a price capping process for the mining companies selling
electricity, but it also ensures the viability of the market. It is to be noted for instance that
the cost of bulk power supply is generally 50 to 70% of the distributor’s total supply
costs.72 Therefore, captive customers supplied by a distributor who is the purchaser in
70
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the PPA must be guaranteed that the price at which the distributor will buy the electricity
will not be too high. In addition in Sub-Saharan Africa where 28 IPPs have been
counted as of 2008, the price charged by the IPP under a PPA ranges from US$
0.04/kWh to 0.40/kWh73, with the upper bound being often unaffordable for SubSaharan Africa public utilities.
One possibility is to cap PPA tariffs, like in the state of Andra Pradesh in India where the
capped price is based on benchmarking specific parameters of the power generation
process74 but this method requires a micro-level regulation that may be too costly for
regulators. The alternative is an overall benchmarking method, as used in Nigeria.
With the capping process, the challenge for the regulator is to avoid artificially fixing low
prices, since this would prevent distributors from finding willing suppliers and hamper
the long-term development of the electricity supply. A solution is to have a softer system
where the regulator does not fix artificial prices, but reviews the prices that have been
fixed by the parties, and issues comments on their reasonableness. See the case of
Nigeria in box 12.
Box 12: Nigeria – A soft regulatory framework, but focused on risk mitigation
The primary role of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) is to issue
generation licenses and fix retail tariffs for electricity end-users.75 For this purpose, it
reviews PPAs for which parties are free to set terms, ensuring that prices are not too
high and that risks have been appropriately allocated. It also requires the purchaser to
sign a declaration stating that it can afford its financial obligations under the contract.
The justification is that the prices and terms fixed in the PPAs, if inappropriate, can have
a negative impact on electricity prices paid by the public, even if end-users are not
parties to the agreement. The parties to the agreement are not required to follow the
comments of the NERC. But if they do not, they risk being forced to prices set by the
NERC. Indeed, the NERC caps the price at which distribution companies can sell to
their captive customers under the NERC’s planned multiyear tariff setting mechanism.
As distribution companies themselves need to comply with this capped price fixed by
the NERC, they cannot afford buying from generators at unreasonably high prices.
There are two exceptions to this review procedure. The NERC will not review the PPA
where the customers of the purchaser under the PPA are not captive, i.e. where they
have alternative sources of electricity. In addition, the NERC will not perform a risk
assessment for suppliers generating a capacity of under 100 MW, but it will still request
information on prices in order to assess potential impacts on general market prices.
The NERC is currently being asked to adopt more specific criteria to assess the fairness
of tariffs. Those criteria could be based either on the “distributor’s current average cost
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPENERGY/Resources/717305-1266613906108/ESMAP_33708_Regulatory.pdf.
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of power”, on a “percentage of the current end-user tariff,” on a “percentage of the
utility’s total costs,” or on the “percentage of the utility’s total power distributed that
would come from the new PPA”.76
Across the world, PPA regulation is conducted differently with various levels of
efficiency. The following table gives an overview of the possible ways to regulate PPAs
in terms of conduct or performance.
Possible approaches to regulatory review of power purchase costs
Type

Regulatory Action
Assist in negotiating PPAs
Ex-ante PPA review

Conduct

Standardized/model PPA

Mandated competitive
77
procurement guidelines
Independent procurement
monitor

Performance

Regulatory efficiency
Lengthen the negotiation
process
Reduce the need for
regulatory
intervention during the term
of the PPA
Reduce transaction costs,
ensures better visibility but
parties still need to set the
contract price and duration
The efficiency of those
guidelines depends on the
independent monitor
ensuring the compliance

Administratively specify a
maximum price

Finding the right level is
generally not in the capacity
of the regulator

Tie maximum price to
competitive power sales

Works if the regulator can
assess the competition
correctly
Ensure objective pricing
standards – works if there
are multiple distribution
companies – works if not a
lengthy process

Benchmarking of overall
power purchase costs of
distribution companies
Benchmarking of individual
PPAs

Adapted from Besant-Jones, Tenenbaum and Tallapragada

In force in following countries:
Kenya (Second wave of IPPs)
Andhra Pradesh (India) and United
States (1980s and early 1990s) and
Panama
Proposed in Pakistan and India

Proposed in Laos and Florida
Issue public reports
Southeastern United States: the
78
affiliate problem
Chile: too low
Pakistan: too high initially (did not
benefit from competition)
Nigeria: proposed as the generation
79
component of the MYTO
Chile: maximum price in “nonfree”
market can be no higher than 15% of
“free” market price
Colombia and Netherlands;
Proposed in Nigeria (2006)

80

Fees charged to access the network: In addition, power sector regulations include
regulations of tariffs charged to access the distribution and transmission systems (which
include wheeling charges81 and stand-by fees82 charged for utility’s services).
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For independent generators to be incentivized to connect to the grid, they should be
guaranteed non-discriminatory prices, in particular in a context where the utility (or if a
private company owning the transmission lines also owns generation facilities) might be
tempted to increase its prices for competitors, and favor electricity produced by its own
generators. Eskom, the South African public utility has been criticized by mining
companies for exercising this kind of discrimination (see box 13).
Box 13: South Africa – Mining companies are asking for the unbundling of Eskom
The South Africa Electricity Regulation Act No. 4 of 2006 requires the generator to sells
its electricity to Eskom, acting as “Single Buyer.” Mining companies have been
pressuring the government to come up with laws that would be more favorable to
independent production, without the single buyer requirement. Mining companies
criticize the fact that they are required to sell their electricity to Eskom and that
guarantee mechanisms are not set up to help them negotiate fair terms with Eskom for
access to its electricity distribution network. To overcome this stumbling block, the plan
is therefore to unbundle Eskom’s generation activities from the distribution network and
put the latter in the hands of an independent agency, probably a state-owned entity.
Eskom would then compete with other producers to sell their power to the independent
agency at agreed tariffs and on an arm’s length basis.83 The Electricity Regulation
Second Amendment Bill of December 19, 201184has been developed to address this
criticism but has not yet been passed as of September 2012.
As said earlier the solution to the access issue and to the problem of the discriminatory
price of interconnections in most electricity markets has been to unbundle and create a
whole sale market to guarantee arm’s length negotiations between distribution
companies and private generators. However, starting with an independent regulatory
agency to oversee the system and resolve access and tariffs disputes (as described in
box 14 for the case of Australia’ Northern Territory with its vertically integrated power
utility) is already a fundamental step towards encouraging the participation of mining
company’s own generation in the power market.
Box 14: Australia – Mechanism to resolve access dispute85
The Utilities Commissioner is in charge of the regulation of the transmission and
distribution businesses of the vertically integrated Northern Territory’s power utility, the
Power and Water Authority (PAWA). The regulation consists in conciliating and
arranging arbitration in any access dispute, monitoring compliance with the Electricity
Networks (Third Party Access) Code of the Northern Territory, registering access
81
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agreements and determining a revenue cap that will apply to the parties of the PPA.
The revenue cap is set at a level allowing the electricity supplier to raise sufficient
revenues to cover its operating costs, finance necessary new investment, and get a
satisfying return on past investment. In addition, PAWA must produce a set of reference
tariffs for standard network access services, which must then be approved by the
Utilities Commissioner. Individual access charges are left to commercial negotiation but
should remain within limits set by the annual revenue cap and subject to the reference
tariffs.
In Western Australia where the utility is also vertically integrated, the regulatory regime
requires the utility to provide indicative access prices calculated so as to recover the
capital costs of providing the transmission and distribution network, capital investment in
new works and a reasonable rate of return. The regulatory regime also requires the
utility to make spare capacity and new capacity available to newcomers on a “first
come, first served” basis, “so long as such investment is commercially viable.”
Planning for the supply and demand on the networks with IPPs: Intimately attached to
sound policy and regulatory frameworks are coherent power sector plans. Ideally those
plans would include “setting a reliability standard for energy security; completion of
detailed supply and demand forecasts; a least-cost plan with alternative scenarios; and
clarifying how new generation production will be split between the private and public
sectors as well as the requisite bidding and procurement processes for new builds”.86
Those plans would allow the regulation of the quantity and quality of electricity on the
network in the short term and long term.
Indeed, with the new connections from the mining’s own generators comes the
challenge of regulating the supply and demand of electricity. Where too little or too
much energy in the network create dysfunctions in the power supply, it is essential to
have a regulator to control volume on the network and order generators to either
connect or disconnect, depending on the needs of the network, with sufficient notice.
The regulator must find back-up supply in the case of shortages. In the case of
expected surpluses, the regulator must order generators to engage in rerouting, load
alterations, shedding (cutting off loads).
The regulator could resort to access charges to regulate the quality of the system. If the
access charges are based on small duration availability rather than differentiating
between peak and off-peak times, it will encourage generators to undertake internal
demand management to reschedule production (where possible) to lower cost times,
which in aggregate smooth power consumption, reducing power prices in peak times
and closing supply gaps87.
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Summary: Policy and regulatory framework necessary to encourage the contribution of
mining companies to the increase in generation capacity in the host country
Favorable
investment
Climate

Clear policy
Framework

Clear, consistent
and fair regulatory
supervision

Coherent power
sector planning

Stable macroeconomic policies
Legal system allows contracts to be enforced, laws to be upheld, arbitration
Good repayment record and investment grade rating (for the public utility)
Requires less (costly) risk-mitigation techniques to be employed which translates
into lower cost of capital and hence lower project costs and more competitive
prices
Framework enshrined in legislation
Framework clearly specifies market structure and roles and terms for private and
public sector investments (generally for single buyer model, not, yet, wholesale
competition in African context)
Reform-minded ‘champions’, concerned with long run, lead and implement
framework
Improves general performance of private and public sector assets
Transparent and predictable licensing and tariff framework improves investor
confidence
Cost-reflective tariffs ensure revenue sufficiency
Consumers protected
Energy security standard in place; planning roles and functions clarified
Vested with lead, appropriate (skilled, resourced and empowered) agency
Takes into consideration hybrid market (public and private stakeholders and their
respective real costs of capital) and fairly allocates new build opportunities among
stakeholders
Has built-in contingencies to avoid emergency power plants or blackouts

Source: Adapted from Gratwick, K. N., and A. Eberhard. 2008
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Encouraging group power plants
It is often the case that, when the upfront costs are substantive, companies benefit from
partnering because of the related economic gains in terms of risk sharing and
economies of scale. The partnership takes the form of joint ownership with other
companies (being generators, electricity users or equity providers) of either a specific
power plant (the consortium model or the special purpose vehicle model – to further
diminish the financial risk exposure of the owners) or a company owning a portfolio of
energy-related projects (the joint venture model). Having a local partner (private or
state-owned) or a Development Finance Institution in those structures have been said to
reduce the political risk.89
Brazil (box 15) and Finland (box 16) present interesting examples of company
partnership to finance massive hydro and nuclear plants.
Box 15: Brazil – Joint - investments to face the energy crisis
In 1999, the U$240mn Igarapava hydroelectric power plant in Brazil began full
operations with a total capacity of 210MW. The power generation project is a private
sector consortium of mining and power companies: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional
(CSN) (17.9%), CVRD (Vale) (38.2%), Cia Mineira de Metais (23.9%), Minas Gerais
88
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integrated power company Cemig (14.5%) (former state-owned utility) and Mineração
Morro Velho (5.5%). The project helped CSN, a Brazilian steel producer, gained an
important competitive advantage with electricity costs around US$5/MW, whereas
sourcing from Eletrobras, the Brazilian state-run utility had a cost of US$38/MW.90
The energy crisis, in 2001, gave the mining sector a stronger incentive to invest in
power generation. The aluminum industry was one of the most affected, accumulating
losses of more than US$ 500 million by the end of 2002, due to energy rationing,
reduced production and export losses.91 Mining companies, therefore, decided to
increase joint investments to ensure power supply and increase gains from economies
of scale. In 2001, a consortium of mining and steel mill industries won the 35-year Santa
Isabel hydroelectric concession. The consortium, Gesai, includes the following
members: Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (43.85%), Billiton Metais (20,60%), Alcoa
(20%), Votorantim (10%) and Camargo Correia (5,55%). The power plant has an
installed capacity of 1,087 MW and costs approximately US$ 720 million. 92
In Finland, the Mankala structure is a Finnish financing structure under which several
industrial customers pool their resources to finance their shares in a generating facility.
This structure mitigates the electricity market risk, since the revenues of the generator
are secured by long-term off-take agreements with its owners (see box 16).
Box 16: Finland – The Mankala pooling structure
Fennovoima is a Finnish company owning nuclear power plants generating more than
2,500 MW. It has 68 shareholders, including the mining company Talvivaara Mining
Company, which owns a share of 60 MW.93 Altogether, Fennovoima’s shareholders use
more than one third of the national electricity consumption. Shareholders pay for the
fixed and variable costs of generation in exchange for at-cost electricity and return rates
according to their respective shares.94
The second example is Tellisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), structured as a non-profit
organization. All the shareholders are jointly liable for TVO’s annual fixed costs, even in
cases where electricity is not produced. Those costs amount to 80 to 85 % of the total
costs and include debt installments and interest payments. In addition, shareholders
also need to pay TVO’s variable costs according to the proportion of their off-take.95 But
according to Standard and Poor’s, TVO suffers from high financial risk ratios and
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therefore proposes that TVO sell its surplus to the Nordic spot market “at a price above
its full production cost.”96
Through joint-projects, companies can, not only, scale up their contribution to the
domestic power supply but also diminish the environmental footprint of the power
project. In Liberia, for instance, the World Bank has assessed that a collective hydrobased solution over individual coal-fired plant could potentially save at least 22,000
tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions over the life of the mines.97
Despite the business case for coordination between mining companies when it comes
to investment in infrastructure, coordination doesn’t often happen because either
companies perceive earlier access to power supply as a competitive advantage or
because information asymmetry is not shared within clusters of power-intensive
industry. This lack of coordination can generate a loss for the host country both in terms
of unnecessary duplication of infrastructure as well as wasted scale economies.
Therefore there is a need for the government to create coordination mechanisms and
encourage group power plants in mining areas.
3. Situation Three: There is a grid and sourcing from the grid is less expensive
than own generation
In a scenario where electricity provided by the grid is less expensive than self-generated
electricity, mines will all buy electricity from the grid. In this situation, there is a risk for
the grid to reach capacity and become unreliable. The challenge is therefore to find
mechanisms to increase generation and grid capacity and avoid unsteady electricity
supply. To be able to continue accessing cheap electricity, mines will generally work
with utilities under various commercial arrangements to either sell distributed
generation98 or create/ upgrade generation, transmission and distribution capacity to
meet their demand. The challenge is to find the commercial framework to leverage the
mining energy demand that generates cost savings for the mining industry and welfare
gains for the host country. Different commercial arrangements are presented in this
section.
Compensating companies for using the idle capacity of their back-up generators
According to the World Bank, mining firms tend to build their own backup generating
capacity regardless of the supply from the public grid, to ensure elevators, air pumps,
and other safety devices remain fully operational at all times.99 Accordingly, this backup
power capacity also represents a potential source of generating power if needed,
although this supply is expensive.
In India, steady increases in demand have outstripped the ability of the utilities to
provide reliable power in many regions. At the same time, when they do not rely on co96
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generation as seen previously (box 8), companies have also developed their own diesel
backup generating capacity to adapt to frequent interruptions of supply. As the supply
shortage grew more severe, an innovative commercial model was adopted in the city of
Pune to utilize companies’ backup generating capacity to cater to peak demand (see
box 17).
Box 17: Pune, India – Using unused back-up supply to power the
neighborhoods100
In 2006, the city of Pune in the state of Maharashtra was suffering from load shedding
for two to three hours per day. There was an estimated shortfall of 90MW of generating
capacity, whereas the top 30 industrial operators in Pune had unutilized captive
capacity of 100MW. In this context, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) (more
than 9,000 different companies, including mining companies and energy producers)
proposed to the Maharashatra Electricity Regulatory Commission that the operators
utilize more of their idle capacity and less of the grid power to meet the shortfall.101 Of
course, the industrial users wanted to be compensated for having to use more
expensive captive power compared to cheaper grid power – the captive plants were
mainly powered by liquid fuels such as diesel, which has a much higher variable cost
than the grid. The CII proposed that industry be compensated for generating its own
power by being paid the difference between the grid high-transmission tariff and its
generating cost. The compensation costs were to be borne by consumers in Pune, in
return for no load-shedding. The State regulator approved the model and set the
“reliability charge” at Rs. 0.42/kWh to be levied on all consumers of more than 300
kWh/month within Pune Urban Circle, serving as an incentive to lower energy
consumption.
However, the Pune model ran into sustainability issues as the demand within Pune
soon exceeded the captive capacity by 2008. The Maharashtra State distribution
company ultimately franchised out the distribution and supply of electricity within Pune
to Tata Power, which was tasked with generating 40MW of distributed energy and
sourcing sufficient energy from elsewhere to meet the deficit in Pune.
The success of this model relies on large captive capacity and on the willingness of
consumers to pay for increased reliability. In addition, Pune-specific factors, such as low
distribution losses (16.5% in Pune), high collection efficiency and a relatively high share
of industrial and commercial consumption, have been critical for the success of the
model since they’ve helped keep the reliability charges acceptable to beneficiaries. 102
This model is however a short-term solution in the sense that the supply remains limited
to industrials’ idle capacity and can be quickly outstripped by growing demand. The long
term solution goes beyond distributed generation and looks rather at creating and
financing additional supply as well as improving energy efficiency. See further details
below.
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The utility and mining companies share the financial burden of additional generation and
transmission capacity
• Mines pay back through utility bills or negotiate lower utility bills if they invest
Most simply, the utility can finance the cost of additional generation, with repayment
over time through tariffs from the customer, the mines. This is the case in the interesting
case of Zambia (see box 18), where the utility supplying most of the mines of the copper
belt is a private independent power transmission network. To attract investments, often
electricity tariffs are subsidized for mines as it used to be the case in Zambia. It
shouldn’t be the case as it endangers the financial capacity of the utility to pursue the
necessary investments.
Box 18: Zambia – Mines pays back for the investment in new hydro-power
generation through higher tariffs
In March 2012, Zambian independent power transmission group, Copperbelt Energy
Corporation Plc, supplying power bought from Zesco, the public utility, to most of the
mining operations on Zambia’s copperbelt, and the Nigeria financial institution Africa
Finance Corporation (a hybrid investment bank and multilateral development financial
Institution established by treaty amongst sovereign states) have signed a deal to
finance the construction of two hydro-power projects in Zambia. Under this deal, the
projects that will be developed include the Kabompo Gorge Hydro Power Project in
North-Western Zambia at a cost of US$150 million and the Luapula Hydro Schemes in
Luapula Province at a cost of US$1 billion. The Kabompo project is expected to bring
development opportunities to the area and would also connect into the main Zambian
electricity grid through a transmission line to the nearest ZESCO substation at
Lumwana.103 The Luapala project is a cross-border project with DRC. CEC signed a
MoU with DRC’s public utility SNEL in April 2012 to cooperate in the feasibly study.104
Electricity has been a major issue in Zambia with the copper industry growth being
constrained by available electricity supply. State utility, Zesco, has resorted to rationing
power to residents but according to CEC, these projects could help bring a power
surplus of about 6000 MW by 2016.105
However CEC warns that industrial electricity tariffs will need to increase by 20-30% per
year to reach cost reflectivity and support new investments in generation.106 Mines have
been protected by a stabilization agreement between 2008 and 2011 stipulating that
mines will not suffer from an increase in tariff during that period. In 2011, with the tariff
stabilization ending, Zesco has increased its bulk supply tariff to CEC by 30%, which
has been approved by the independent regulator. Zesco and CEC need to negotiate a
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five-year framework for further tariff increase to reach cost reflective level for the bulk
supply tariffs.107
In the U.S., mining companies and utilities work out different ways to build new
transmission lines and substations to procure electricity to mining sites (see box 19).
Box 19: United States – Sharing the financing of new distribution lines and
substations
In the U.S., mining companies generally source their electricity from the grid. The
mining companies will generally assume a portion of the cost of constructing the
connecting line from the closest utility line. For a connected load of up to about 1,000
horsepower, or about 745,700 watts, it is known to be cheaper to let the utility provide a
primary substation. For loads over 745,700 watts, constructing a private primary
substation to transform incoming power to usage voltages may be more economical in
exchange of more favorable rates.108
• Mines invest themselves in distribution networks and operate them
When 1)sourcing power from the grid is not expensive, 2) the demand from the mine is
substantial and 3) in addition the power market is vertically separated, there might be a
business case for the mining customer to own and operate the distribution network, in
addition to generation capacity, to ensure readily available electricity supply for the
mine. This is the case of BHP and its Olympic Dam project in South Australia (see box
20).
Box 20: South Australia – BHP Billiton financing and operating distribution lines
BHP Billiton’s mine at Olympic Dam, South Australia, will be the largest uranium
producer by 2020 and the largest open-cut copper mine in the world. BHP-Billiton owns
and operates an AC network comprising a 275 kV transmission line, a 132 kV
transmission line, associated substations and distribution works that supply its project.109
BHP wants to expand the mine to process six times more minerals. With the planned
developments, there would be additional electricity needs of 650 MW, i.e. 10% of South
Australia’s base-load demand. In addition to building a gas fired power station and its
related pipeline, one of the options that BHP is considering for electricity supply is
financing a new 270 km 275 kV transmission line linking the project to Port Augusta,
designed with spare capacity to meet the rising demand for electricity in the region, i.e.
at Olympic Dam but also in the Roxby Down area. BHP plans to provide 50 MW to the
copper mining company OZ Minerals for the development of its Prominent Hill mining
project (130 km away from Olympic Dam).110
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This private participation in the power assets is an opportunity for the country but when
the network relies on private financing, the challenge is in the implementation of thirdparty access to existing transmission networks, while maintaining incentives for primary
investors to build new networks if needed. Enforcement of third-party access requires
an access regime as designed in Australia (see box 21) or as considered in the US (see
box 22).
Box 21: South Australia – Access regimes111
Network operators participating in the national electricity market as in South Australia
are required to comply with the access arrangements in the National Electricity Code
(NEC). The code is jointly administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC), the NEC administrator and State regulators:
-The ACCC is responsible for assessing applications for changes to the access
provisions of the code; assessing undertakings submitted by individual network service
providers; and regulating network pricing for transmission services.
-The NEC administrator is responsible for the development and enforcement of
the access provisions, managing any changes to the code and liaising with the ACCC.
-The State regulators are responsible for distribution networks, retail licenses, safety
and environmental standards and regulating network pricing for distribution services.
The inherent problem with third party access is preserving the advantage of the party
that paid for the upfront costs and would like to keep priority access for its capacity.
This is the topic under discussion in the United States (see box 22).
Box 22: United States – Discussion on access regime for generators’ lead lines
In April 2012, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Notice of
Inquiry (NOI)112, requesting comments from market participants. The NOI targets
generator’s lead lines that are built and owned by generators to transmit power from
generation projects to the transmission network. Now, a generator does not have to file
an Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) unless it receives a request for
interconnection from a third-party and the FERC treats the generators’ lead lines on a
case by case basis with no blanket access regime for those lead lines. “The
Commission seeks to explore whether, and, if so, how the Commission should revise its
current policy concerning priority rights and open access with regard to [lead lines of
generation developers]”. In particular, the Commission seeks options for addressing
priority rights of generation developers for their future capacity on lead lines: should
third-party interconnections be accommodated through an OATT framework or through
an extension of the Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) framework in
which the existing LGIA provisions that govern third-party use of a transmission
provider’s interconnection facilities would be extended to the lead lines of generators.
The other challenge of a privately-financed distribution network in a context of low
electricity access is ensuring that the new line is designed with additional capacity and
meets the demand of the not-yet connected towns on the way; which requires the
coordination of a mine’s development plan with that of the country.
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Additional generation through energy efficiency
• Sharing the burden of asset upgrading
Additional generation capacity can come from the upgrade of existing assets or the
expansion of the grid network, rather than through building additional generation
capacity. This is particularly true in countries whose power source is hydropower given
that hydropower plants are a lumpy investment (see Introduction). The question is
determining the party responsible for financing this upgrade.
When sourcing power from the grid is not expensive and the demand from the mine is
substantial, the mine is often interested in mobilizing its financial and technical capacity
to contribute to the capital cost of the asset and to be compensated through reduced (or
zero) tariffs. This has been the case in the DRC, where the electricity source is
hydropower (see box 23).
Box 23: DRC – When mining companies upgrade existing electric infrastructure
In March 2012, Katanga Mining Ltd. announced that it signed an agreement with SNEL,
DRC’s public utility, for a US $283.5 million loan to upgrade the DRC’s electricity
generation and transmission networks. US$189 million will be reimbursed to the
company by its affiliates at the mines of Kansuki and Mutanda which will utilize a
substantial part of the new electricity produced. According to the agreement, 10% of the
power generated will be extra and sold back to SNEL. US$261.8 million of this
investment will be reimbursed through utility bill credits and SNEL will additionally pay
interests on the loan. According to Katanga Mining, the new 450 MW capacity to be
reached by the end of 2015 will allow a 310,000 tonne/year copper production. 113

• Using the potential of smart technology
With the dissemination of better technologies, additional generation capacity is more
and more sought through energy efficiency with a reduction of transmission and
distribution losses using techniques such as better isolation, retrofitting of lines and
interconnection. In addition, smart grid technologies can improve energy efficiency by
allowing the provision of electricity on demand, while traditional systems are designed to
carry a constant level of electricity, regardless of whether it will be consumed at the enduser level or not. The mining industry has become an adapter of this technology: for
instance, the Rocky Mountain Institute, recently contracted with the mining company Rio
Tinto to improve the efficiency of its operations and energy infrastructure with its
expertise in smart grid technology;114 the Oyu Tolgoi project in Mongolia (see box 1)
signed a $15 million with the engineering company ABB to upgrade the distribution lines
leading to the mine with Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS).
FACTS “allow more power to reach consumers with minimal environmental impact,
lower investment costs and shorter implementation times than the traditional alternative
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of building new power plants or transmission lines. They also help address voltage and
frequency stability issues and enable the transmission system to run more efficiently.”115
With demand and response mechanisms, and smart grid technologies in general,
mining companies could evolve from simple consumers of electricity to dynamic and
proactive producers, becoming a “prosumer”.116 As a prosumer, one is not only taking
electricity from the grid, but also feeding the grid with electricity, enabling it to be
connected while having the ability to operate in isolation when needed, which increases
security and reliability of the system. This model requires coordination between the
mining industry and the public utility to finance this tremendous upgrade that consists in
installing a smart grid, dynamic pricing signals on which the selling mining company can
rely, storage facilities to ensure reliability and interconnection, standard distributed
resource interconnection policies for each grid operator, and high-tech
telecommunication infrastructure.117
Those smart technologies would also benefit from better coordination within the mining
industry. In Chile, the government’s efficiency targets worked as an incentive for
companies to coordinate to co-invest in research on energy efficiency and share results
(see box 24).
Box 24: Chile – Coordination among private companies to improve energy
efficiency
Due to the energy crisis in Chile, the new government recently announced targets of
energy efficiency improvements among industrial users in the country: reducing
projected energy consumption through 2020 by 12%,118 targeting especially the mining
industry, which accounts for 38% of all power produced on the central SIC and northern
SING grids.
The private sector, as a response, decided to join forces and in 2006 created the Mining
Working Group for Energy Efficiency, a voluntary affiliation of the 13 largest mining
companies of the national market in addition to other participants, such as the Chilean
Chapter of the International Copper Association, the Mining Council, Country
Programme for Energy Efficiency and the Mining Ministry. Its objective is to promote
energy efficiency research through technology development and innovation,
disseminate results, evaluate pilot projects, and foster a culture of energy efficiency
within the mining companies of the working group.119
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4. Cross-cutting issue: Public- Private Coordination
Whether miners make significant purchases of electricity from the national grid or sell
their extra-capacity to the grid, it represents an opportunity for the country’s power
infrastructure. In the first case, it ensures stability of demand and incentives to increase
the supply; in the second case, it allows cheaper grid electricity. For these opportunities
to be maximized there is a need of coordination and integration of the companies’ plan
into the government plans. More coordination and planning at the outset could better
realize opportunities of shared platforms and scale economies.
For instance, prior to the civil war in Liberia, for example, Bong mines used to buy
electricity from the grid during one part of the year and sell during the rest. During the
wet season, Bong mines would purchase Mount Coffee hydropower energy from the
national grid (LEC) and sell thermal power to LEC during the dry season. The
arrangement was mutually advantageous: it allowed LEC to sell excess capacity from
hydropower in the wet season and Bong mines to benefit from cheaper electricity. At the
same time, by purchasing electricity from Bong mines in the dry season, LEC could
benefit from economies of scale in generating thermal power.120
In Panama, a new project expects to supply power to the grid during the first years,
which mutually benefits the company and the country, but will buy from the grid after its
tenth year of operation (see box 25), giving time to the country to build the required
infrastructure.
Box 25: Panama – Sourcing from own-generation or the grid according to
circumstances
Cobre Panama Project aims to be the largest private investment in Panama. With a total
investment of more than US$5 billion, the mine will produce 255,000 tons of copper per
year.
The project involves a 300MW thermoelectric plant as well as a transmission line from
the plant to the mine, connected to the Llano Sanchez substation on the Panamanian
grid.121
During the first nine years, the power plant will supply 100% of the mine’s electricity
requirements and will sell the excess, around 40-50MW according to the company’s
projections, to the National Integrated System (Sistema Integrado Nacional, SIN)122
obtaining utility bill credits in exchange. The power plant is expected to produce electric
power at an average life-of-mine cost of ¢US4.43/kWh, resulting in significant cost
savings for the company compared to an average cost of ¢US10/kWh in Panama.123
The cost savings will also translate into lower energy costs to the customer since in the
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Panamanian spot market, electricity price is given by the cost of production of the last
generating unit dispatched.124
The mine will also buy from the grid 1) during power plant maintenance activities, which
happens normally during the wet season when there is an oversupply of energy on the
grid and 2) when the energy requirements will increase as the mine start to access
lower grade ore – which will happen after the tenth year according to companies’
plans.125 The company anticipates that within ten years, the electricity from the grid will
be cheap enough and their demand so high that sourcing from the grid will be more
economical.
It remains unclear if the Liberian and Panama situations are the result of integration of
companies’ and government’s plans, but the two situations reveal that coordination
results in cost savings for both parties.
Coordination can also take the form of a government bringing support to the mining
industry by supplying the feedstock to increase the capacity of own-generation plant
beyond the needs of the project. Saudi Arabia (box 26) and Afghanistan (box 27) are
two illustrations.
Box 26: Saudi Arabia – Mutually beneficial partnership
Saudi Electricity projects an increase from 193GWh in 2009 to 251GWh in 2013 in the
country power consumption. Markets estimates also suggest that desalination capacity
in the country needs to double over the next 20 years to cover drinking water alone.126
A joint venture project with the American aluminum producer Alcoa and Ma’aden, a 50%
Saudi Government company, will help the government increase power generation and
desalination capacity. The US$10.8 billion project includes a bauxite mine, an alumina
refinery, an aluminum smelter and a rolling mill. To ensure sufficient power and water
supply, Ma’aden signed an agreement with the state-owned companies, SEC (Saudi
Electricity Company) and SWCC (Saline Water Conversion Corporation) and to
construct a joint power and desalination plant in RasAz-Zawr that will generate 2,400
MW of electricity and 11.025 million cubic meters of desalinated water a day. Ma’aden
will use 1,350 MW of electricity and 25,000 cubic meters of desalinated water a day,
while SEC and SWCC will use the remainder. The larger scale of the project will benefit
from economies of scale, and therefore increase energy efficiency. The joint project will
also benefit from water supply and delivery of electricity six months earlier than the
original schedule.127 The project was originally powered with fuel oil at a cost of
US$40/MWh, but the government allocated a supply of gas to the project, reducing the
cost of energy to US$/24MWh. With the support of the government, Ma’aden is set to
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become the world’s lowest-cost producer of aluminum and di-ammonium phosphate
fertilizer (DAP).128
In Afghanistan, a country with low electrification rates, the government agreed to supply
adequate coal to some mining projects. On the counterpart, those companies will use
their expertise to build transmissions lines to important cities and deliver electricity at
cost (see box 27).
Box 27: Afghanistan – Free coal in exchange of power infrastructure
In 2008, the Ministry of Mines from Afghanistan signed a US$ 3.3 billion deal with China
Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) to explore and process Aynak copper deposits
in the Logar province.129 From May 2008 to August 2010, both parties negotiated and
signed five ancillary agreements, including contracts dealing with security, water, power
and coal mines, other minerals, and a railway. The power and coal mining ancillary
agreements envision MCC to build and operate a 400MW coal fired power plant and the
coal mine to feed it. MCC will also pay for the transmission system to bring the power to
the grid and to Kabul City: a 220KV two-circuit high-tension transmission line, with total
distance of 280km. Transmission lines will be constructed to deliver 200MW to Aynak
while the other 200MW will be distributed on the national grid in Kabul for use by
ratepayers.130
According to the power supply agreement, the government is responsible in providing
sufficient coal reserves to MCC with no less than 100 million tons of coal to meet the
demand for constructing a 400MW thermal power plant. About three coal mines will
provide the 1.2 million tons per year of coal to the project. Another mining project in the
country, Hajigak, employs the same design but in this case, 50% of the power will also
be provided to the community at cost.131
The main purpose of those projects is to provide power to the mining projects and
supply the surplus capacity to the government at cost price in order to promote local
economic development.
The benefits of coordination and integration of companies’ plans into government plans
can also be observed when looking at the counterfactual. While the government
strategy remains in disconnection from the mining industry’s plans, Chile suffers from a
continuous energy crisis (see box 28).
Box 28: South of Chile – Mines suffer from a non-integrated grid
In the early eighties, Chile drastically privatized its electricity sector and created a
competitive environment. However, after years of underinvestment, the electrical grid
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has become costly and fragile. As a result, the Chilean copper industry has to rely on
more expensive forms of energy, such as diesel, which are twice as expensive as
coal.132
Chile's mining industry has been asking for grid integration for many years since it
would enable projects in the north to access cheaper power from hydroelectric and
renewable energy on the Southern grid.133 It could bring energy costs down by 4.1% on
average throughout the SIC and SING, and offer an important solution to the power
needs of the mining sector. Until now, the IPR-GDF Suez is the only firm to have offered
proposals on the interconnection. The project is a 570km double circuit transmission
line and would cost about US$ 600 million. Whether the project will be financially viable,
depends on the energy demand from mining companies but in any event the Chilean
government is not interested in financially contributing to the cost for now.134
In Pilbara, Australia, the lack of coordination between companies in addition to the lack
of government involvement in the interconnection of the grids prevents the industry from
gaining massive cost savings (see box 29).
Box 29: Pilbara, Australia – Missed opportunity
According to recent studies, 3,000 MW of new capacity will be required by 2020 to meet
the demand of new mining projects in Pilbara, mainly related to iron ore. Iron ore
miners have been historically responsible for the provision of their entire
infrastructure.135 In addition because of the long distances between loads and high
management and operation costs due to frequent cyclonic activity and high ambient
temperatures, Pilbara has never benefited from an interconnected network. This
explains why some transmission lines run on parallel routes, not connected and with
different voltages. Without central coordination, some sections of the network have
excess capacity, while other sections are heavily constrained.136
Nevertheless, as the number and scale of loads increase, the case to develop a
coordinated network grows stronger and the relative costs drop significantly. Studies
suggest that “an integrated transmission system with large-scale efficient generation,
compared to a gas pipeline with isolated generation, could reduce daily gas
consumption in the Pilbara by 186-573 TJ as of 2019”. In addition, it would provide
electricity more economically and with greater reliability. Having multiple generators with
different cost characteristics supplying electricity into an open access and common-user
network would allow for the optimal cost generation to be selected at any time. It would
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also enable small to medium-sized mining projects that could not otherwise
economically justify individual power generation.137
The government of Western Australia has not excluded the option of an integrated
electrical grid, but contends that the private sector should pay for it. All earlier attempts
to develop a bigger network have failed because of the lack of a suitable third party
facilitator138 as well as different time horizons for new projects, which diminishes the
opportunity for some multi-user facilities. This is exacerbated by the competitive nature
of the mining industry, as they compete to have their respective projects developed
earlier and thus gain market share.139
Even when the government is willing to coordinate and plan with the industry, the
mining projects are so time-sensitive that waiting for government plans often present a
substantive loss from delays, acting as a disincentive to coordinate. The desire to avoid
this wait was what encouraged Karara mining (see box 30) to quickly engage in the
financing of power infrastructure for the Mid-West project. The company did not try to
set up a joint-financing project with the public utility, but rather relied on the
creditworthiness of the utility to be reimbursed later on.
Box 30: Western Australia – Karara Mining participates in the Mid-West Energy
project to accelerate the process
The Mid-West Energy Project (MWEP) 140 is one of the largest transmission line projects
ever undertaken in Western Australia. The goal is to build transmission lines to
overcome the current capacity constraints on the existing lines, connect the different
power generators of the region, and link them to the new mining operations. The lines
are funded jointly by the Western Australian State Government and Karara Mining
Limited (KML) through different arrangements. KML developed the $1.2 bn Karara Iron
Ore Project and financed, built and owns the 105 km 330 kV high voltage line from its
mining operations to the town of Three Springs. On behalf of Western Power, KML also
financed and built the Terminal Substation at Three Springs and extended the 330 kV
line from this Substation to the town of Eneabba, where the line connects to the public
network operated by the public utility Western Power. KML will be reimbursed later on
by Western Power. Thus, KML will be supplied in electricity by Western Power that will
use its State electricity grid to transmit power to Three Springs and then to the mine via
KML’s 330kV line.
To explain its participation, KML said: “By building and funding the line itself, Karara
ensured its power supply would be in place well before it was needed, removing risks
associated with relying on third parties to provide crucial infrastructure. This is also
another excellent example of the flow-on benefits that come from the development of
major resource projects such as Karara, with the construction of this new 330kV
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transmission line acting as a key catalyst for the first stage of Western Power’s MWEP,
which will ultimately benefit communities across the Midwest region with greater
security and reliability of supply.” 141
In Western Australia, in an attempt to accelerate the planning process and optimize
coordination with companies, the government has introduced Development Assessment
Panels. These panels consist of two local government counselors and three
independent experts with technical knowledge. These DAPs help improve the planning
system by providing more transparency, consistency and reliability in decision-making.
In terms of power generation, projects that cost more than US$ 7 million, outside Perth,
must be assessed by the Panel, but is optional for smaller projects.142
Another interesting initiative to ensure multilevel coordination both within government
agencies and between government agencies, the mining industry, and civil society is in
Mongolia, where the government together with the World Bank, proposed the creation
of specialized institutions to oversee the national infrastructure development process
(see box 31).
Box 31: Mongolia – An institutional framework for more efficient planning143
In Mongolia, the government is organizing negotiation forums with the mining industry to
oversee infrastructure developments and define priorities, with plans to create new
institutions to further this goal as described below. One body will be granted with the
right to take the lead with regards to infrastructure development decisions, and
implement the overall integrated development plan that each of the following agencies
would then be charged to implement according to its particular specialization:
Southern Mongolia Infrastructure Council. The Council would consist of
representatives from the national government, local governments, mining companies,
and NGOs. Its goal would be to serve as a forum for public consultation and exchange
of information. It would be developed either as an advisory committee or as an entity
that makes decisions and finances infrastructure developments.
Southern Mongolia Infrastructure Coordination Unit. This entity would serve as an
information forum to coordinate the multiple levels of local government, and would be
entitled to step in the decision-making process to accelerate it,
PPP Unit. This unit would have expertise in PPP developments to compensate for the
lack of expertise of Mongolia in this field.
Risk Management Unit. Since investors in PPP transactions typically request
government guarantees, this unit would specialize in the negotiation of government
guarantees for PPPs, and it would set caps on governmental risk exposure. In
particular, this unit would report to the government, annually on the extent and
probability of its liabilities.
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International Infrastructure Expert Advisory Panel. To make sure that the
government is negotiating the best deals, it might call on a panel of international experts
to review cases on a case-by-case basis.
Economic Regulation Agency. This agency would have an expertise in tariff setting in
the railway and electricity sectors.
Southern Mongolia Groundwater Management and Information Center. This
agency would be charged with gathering information on groundwater from all the other
government agencies.

Further research
This Policy Paper has set out preliminary findings on appropriate commercial, financial,
technical and regulatory models to leverage the mining industry’s energy demand either
to improve the availability and reliability of the grid or expand electricity access solutions
for the community. Further research144 will include examining more closely the scope for
cost savings for the country and the company of the different institutional arrangements,
laying the emphasis on a quantitative analysis of the different situations.

The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia
Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a leading research
center and forum dedicated exclusively to the study, practice and discussion of
sustainable international investment (SII) worldwide. Through research, advisory
projects, multi-stakeholder dialogue and educational programs, CCSI constructs and
implements an investment framework that promotes sustainable development, builds
trusting relationships for long-term investments, and is easily adopted by
governments, companies and civil society.

144

This research is currently undertaken with the World Bank.

Leveraging the mining industry’s energy demand to improve host countries’ power infrastructure

41

